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International Law and National Security
STEPHEN

DYcus

AND BARRY KELLMAN*

The year 2000 was anything but peaceful, as internal conflicts with international implications continued to smolder in Sierra Leone, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Russia, Colombia,
and elsewhere; Ethiopia and Eritrea fought along their common border; the ancient struggle in the Middle East flared up again; and a truculent Saddam Hussein continued to bar
United Nations weapons inspectors from Iraq. Progress toward reductions in the weapons
of war also seemed to stall. Yet there were no large-scale international armed conflicts, and
the United Nations Security Council played an increasingly active role in stanching the
bloodshed in a number of areas.'
The accession of George W Bush to the U.S. presidency raised serious questions about
the future of international security. During the presidential campaign, Governor Bush and
his advisers indicated that they would withdraw U.S. troops from United Nations peacekeeping forces in the Balkans, despite European protests, while seeking a buildup in U.S.
military strength. President Bush's declared opposition to the Comprehensive Test-Ban
Treaty, as well as his pledge to deploy a national missile defense system, even if it means
abrogating the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, also made prospects for progress
in arms control extremely uncertain.
This review of international security issues in the last year of the twentieth century
addresses conflicts in several regions around the world, then focuses on issues of arms
control, terrorism, intelligence, and access to sensitive information.

*Stephen Dycus is a Professor of Law at Vermont Law School. Barry Kellman is a Professor of Law at
DePaul University College of Law. Thanks are due to Daronda Combs, Lewis Csedrik, and Sue Ann Orsini,

all members of the Vermont Law School Class of 2002, for their assistance with research for this article.
1. In August, an independent panel of experts recommended that United Nations peacekeeping forces be
enlarged and professionalized, better financed, and better equipped to defend themselves and their mandates.
See Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,U.N. Doe. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (2000), availableat
http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace-operations/docs/full-report.htm;

Secretary-GeneralKofi Annan Prom-

isesMajorReform of UN Peacekeeping,U.N. Press Release (Aug. 23, 2000), availableat http://www.un.org/peace/
reports/peace..operations/docs/pr .htn.
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I. Regional Conflicts
A.

AFRICA

During the year, armed conflicts flared in nations across the African continent, including
Angola, Congo, Sierra Leone, and Sudan, and along the border between Ethiopia and
Eritrea. We focus here on those with the greatest potential for spreading to neighboring
states, with special emphasis on the extensive involvement of the United Nations Security
Council.
1. Sierra Leone
In an effort to end a decade of violence that left tens of thousands of people dead or
maimed, the elected government of Sierra Leone and the rebel force called Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) signed a peace agreement in Lom6, Togo on July 7, 1999. Attacks on
civilians and humanitarian workers continued, however, and rebel forces refused to disarm
and demobilize. The United Nations Security Council responded in February 2000 by
ordering an expansion of its existing peacekeeping forces in Sierra Leone to 11,100, charging them especially to provide security at government buildings, speed the flow of humanitarian assistance, and guard military equipment collected from former combatants.'
In early May, the RUF,led by Foday Sankoh, resumed attacks on the government army.
Rebel forces took 500 U.N. peacekeepers hostage and released them only after the intercession of Liberian President Charles Taylor and the dispatch of British troops to help
restore order.' Meanwhile, Mr. Sankoh was captured in the Sierra Leone capital, Freetown,
and held for trial there.4 The U.N. Security Council again raised the number of its peacekeepers in the country, this time to 13,000,1 while the U.S. Senate passed a resolution
declaring that "the United States government should do all in its power to help ensure that
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and its leaders . . .are held accountable for the
6
crimes and abuses committed."
Recognizing the importance of diamond sales in financing the RUF rebellion, the U.N.
Security Council voted on July 5, 2000 to ban all diamond purchases from Sierra Leone
until the development of an effective Certificate of Origin regime.' Later in the year, President Clinton signed a proclamation barring entry into the United States by any persons
(or their spouses, children, or parents) who "plan, engage in, or benefit from activities that
support" the RUF,specifically including Liberian President Charles Taylor and other of-

2. S.C. Res. 1289, U.N. SCOR, 4099th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284 (2000), availableathttp://www.un.org/

Docs/scres/2000/1289e.pdf.
3. SeeCatherine Macleod, Combat Role for Troops Ruled Out: Hoon Insists British Forces' Role Will End Once
UN Mission is Reinforced, HERALD (U.K.), May 16, 2000, at 2; seealso Jane Perlez, U.S. to Send G. 's to Train
Afticansfor Sierra Leone, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2000.
4. Douglas Farah, Rebel Leader Captured; Sankobs Arrest Sparks Jubilation in Sierra Leone's Capital, WASH.
POST, May 18, 2000, at Al.

5. S.C. Res. 1299, U.N. SCOR, 4145th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1299 (2000), availableat http://www.un.org/
Docs/scres/2000/res 1299e.pdf.
6. S. Res. 315, 106th Cong. (2000), available at http://fosalone.org/sres315.html.
7. S.C. Res. 1306, U.N. SCOR, 4168th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1306 (2000), availableathttp://www.un.org/
Docslscres/2000/res/1 306e.pdf.
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ficials of his government.8 Congress followed suit by cutting off assistance to any country
that the Secretary of State determines has provided military aid to the RUF, or that has
assisted in the distribution of illicit diamonds from Sierra Leone.9
In August, the Security Council instructed its peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone to go
on the offensive-to "deter and, where necessary, decisively counter the threat of RUF
attack" and to "assist the Sierra Leone government to extend state authority, restore law
and order, and further stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country."' 0
The United States also sent approximately 200 soldiers to Nigeria to help train and equip
U.N. peacekeeping personnel from several states in the region," although legislation sponsored by Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont forbade assistance to troops that have violated
human rights. 2
Later the same month, in response to continuing acts of savagery by rebel forces against
civilians, the U.N. Security Council agreed to set up a special tribunal for Sierra Leone to
try "crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, as well as crimes under relevant Sierra Leone law committed within the
territory of Sierra Leone." 3 At the end of the year, rebels still held about two-thirds of the
country, prompting the Security Council to adopt yet another resolution expressing disappointment at the RUF's failure to fully abide by its agreements and extending the mandate
of U.N. peacekeeping forces there until March 31, 2001.14

2. Ethiopia and Eritrea
In May, renewed fighting broke out in a two-year-old war between Ethiopia and Eritrea
over the location of their 620-mile common border. 5 Following U.N. Security Council
resolutions condemning the bloodshed and approving an arms embargo, 6 the two states
agreed in June to a cease-fire brokered by the Organization of African Unity and the United
States, pursuant to which U.N. peacekeeping forces would patrol a 15-mile-wide buffer

8. Statement by the President on Liberia (Oct. 11, 2000), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/O
2000-10-11 -statement-by-the-president-on-liberia.html.
9. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106429, § 583, 114 Stat. 1900, 1900A-56 (2000).
10. S.C. Res. 1313, U.N. SCOR, 4184th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1313 (2000), available at http://
www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/resl 313e.pdf.
11. See Ellen Nakashima, ClintonEncouragesNigerian Democracy:FormerPariahCalled "Pivot Point"fbrAfrica,
WASH. PosT, Aug. 27, 2000; Jane Perlez, supra note 3.
12. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106429, § 563, 114 Stat. 1900, 1900A-46 (2000).
13. S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 4186th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000), available at http://
www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/resl 315e.pdf. See Barbara Crossette, U.N. to Establisha War CrimesPanelto Hear
Sierra Leone Atrocity Cases,N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 15, 2000; Elizabeth Neuffer, Will Bush Backpedal on WarCriminals;
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 14, 2001, at DI.

14. S.C. Res. 1334, U.N. SCOR, 4253rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1334 (2000), available at http://
www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/1334e.pdf.
15. See Jane Perlez, U.S. Did Little to Deter Buildup as Ethiopia and Eritrea Preparedfor War, N.Y. TiMES
May 22, 2000.
16. S.C. Res. 1297, U.N. SCOR, 4142nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1297 (2000), available at http://
www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/1297e.pdf; S.C. Res. 1298, U.N. SCOR, 4144th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/1298
(2000), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/1298e.pdf.
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zone along the border." A final peace agreement was signed in December, and U.N.
peacekeepers began to be deployed there soon afterward.9
3. DemocraticRepublic of Congo
Violence continued to plague the former Belgian colony, as military forces from six foreign nations vied for control of different parts of the large, mineral-rich country. Early in
the year, the U.N. Security Council strongly reiterated its support for a 1999 cease-fire
agreement calling for withdrawal of all foreign troops from Congo. 0 It also authorized the
expansion of the U.N. Organizing Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(MONUC) to some 5,500 military personnel, with a mandate, inter alia, to monitor compliance with the cease-fire, facilitate humanitarian assistance, and begin demining. Another
Security Council resolution in June expressed outrage at renewed fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan troops in Kisangani, as well as human rights abuses throughout the
country." It also declared its concern over the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural
resources to support the fighting. Following the signing of disengagement agreements in
Maputo on November 27, 2000, and Harare on December 6, 2000, the Security Council
extended the mandate of MONUC to June 15, 2001, while expressing serious concern
about the spread of HIV among women and girls because of the conflict, and about the
abduction and recruitment of child soldiers.22 Because of continued fighting, however, only
a handful of peacekeeping forces had actually been deployed in Congo by year's end.
B.

LATIN AMERICA

Since the early 1970s the United States has provided assistance to Colombian police and
military forces as part of the U.S. "War on Drugs." The U.S. Congress upped the ante
dramatically in July 2000 in response to Colombian President Andres Pastrana's announcement the year before of a new $7.5 billion program called "Plan Colombia.""3 Plan Colombia is designed not only to fight drugs but also to support the peace process there, provide
economic relief and social development, and strengthen the judicial system and human

17. See Ian Fisher, With Accord Set, Ethiopiaand Eritrea Pause in Fighting,N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2000; Report
of the Secretary General on Ethiopia and Eritrea,U.N. Doc. S/2000/643 (2000), available at http://www.un.org/
Docs/sc/reports/2000/643e.pdf. See also S.C. Res. 1312, U.N. SCOR, 4181st mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/1312
(2000), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/1312e.pdf; S.C. Res. 1320, U.N. SCOR, 4197th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1320 (2000), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/1320e.pdf (authorizing the
deployment of 4,200 peacekeeping troops until March 15, 2001).
18. See Eritrea,EthiopiaFormally End War; Peace Accord Halts Two-Year Conflict, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2000,
at A37; Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (Dec. 14, 2000), U.N. Doc.
S/2000/1194, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unmee/I 94.pdf.
19. See ProgressReport of the Secretary-Generalon Ethiopiaand Eritrea,U.N. Doc. S/2001/45 (2001), available
at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2001/45e.pdf.
20. S.C. Res. 1291, U.N. SCOR, 4104th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1291 (2000), available at http://
www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/1291 e.pdf.
21. S.C. Res. 1304, U.N. SCOR, 4159th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1304 (2000), available at http:/l
www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/1304e.pdf.
22. S.C. Res. 1332, U.N. SCOR, 4247th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1332 (2000), available at http:l/
www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/1332e.pdf.
23. Fiscal Year 2000 Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-246, Title III, 114 Stat. 511, 570
(2000). Another $459 million was targeted at other Andean nations and U.S. anti-drug and law enforcement
agencies.
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rights.24 A new appropriation adds $860 million in emergency counter-narcotics aid to
Colombia for fiscal year (FY) 2000 and FY 2001 to $330 million already approved for
the same period. About three-quarters of that amount is earmarked for assistance to the
Colombian military and police, mostly for sixty helicopters and training for three
battalions.25
Funding was conditioned upon, inter alia, the suspension and prosecution of Colombian
armed forces personnel credibly linked to gross human rights violations or to paramilitary
groups.2 6 In August, however, President Clinton waived all but one of the conditions, as
the statute authorized him to do,27 on grounds that it was "in the national security interest"
to do so.2 The funding measure also directed the president to prepare a report on U.S.
policy and strategy regarding counter-narcotics assistance to Colombia and neighboring
countries,2 9 and the conference committee report on the measure directed the Secretary of
State to report at six-month intervals on progress in abating human rights abuses and
achieving a negotiated peace.30 Concern about "Vietnamization" of U.S. entanglement in
Colombia's long-running civil war also led Congress to limit the number of U.S. military
personnel in the country to 500. However, the president may waive that limitation for up
to ninety days in order to rescue U.S. armed forces there if they become "involved
in hostilities" or if "imminent involvement . . . in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
31
circumstances."
A General Accounting Office report late in the year warned that "the total cost and
activities required to meet the plan's goals remain unknown, and it will take years before
drug activities are significantly reduced."32 Critics of Plan Colombia charged further that
the program simply continues an already-failed U.S. drug eradication policy, that U.S. goals
are ill defined, that widespread human rights abuses are likely to persist, and that aid to the
3
Colombian military may actually damage an already fragile peace process in the country.

24, The program is described and defended in Luis Alberto Moreno, Plan Colombia and Human Rights, 8
HUM. RTs. BRIEF 9 (2000). See generally General Accounting Office, Drug Controk U.S. Assistance to Colombia
Will Take Years to Produce Results (GAO-01-26) (2000).
25. The financing is described in detail in Center for International Policy, The Contents of the ColombiaAid
Package (Dec. 9, 2000), available at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/aidsumm.htm.
26. Pub. L. No. 106-246, § 3201(a)(1), 114 Stat. 573.
27. Pub. L. No. 106-246, § 3201(a)(4), 114 Stat. 573.
28. See Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Memorandum of Justificationin Connection with the
Waivers Under Section 3201(a)(4) of the Emergency SupplementalAct (Aug. 23, 2000), availableat http://clinton6.
nara.gov/2000/08/2000-08-23-memorandum-of-justification-on-colombia.html. See Marc Lacey, Clinton Defends the Outlay of $1.3 Billion to Colombia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2000. See also Joanne Mariner, The Clinton
Administration's Stealth Waiver of Human Rights Protectionsfor Colombia, WRIT, Feb. 8, 2001, available at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/mariner/20010208.html.
29. Pub. L. No. 106-246, § 3202, 114 Stat. at 574. The report may be found at Office of the Press Secretary,
The White House, Letter from the Presidentto the Chairmanof the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations
et al. (Oct. 26, 2000), available at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/102601.htm.
30. See Center for International Policy, The Contents ofthe ColombiaAid Package (Dec. 9, 2000), available at
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/aidsumm.htm. The first report is Department of State, Colombia 60
Day Human Rights Report (Sept. 11, 2000), available at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/091l01.htm.
31. Pub. L. No. 106-246, § 3204(b) and (c), 114 Stat. 576.
32. General Accounting Office, supra note 24, at 5.
33. See Andrew Miller, U.S. Military Supportfor Plan Colombia: Adding Fuel to the Fire, 8 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 8
(2000); Adam Isacson, Plan Colombia: Military Response Fails to Address Social Problems, COLOMBIA UPDATE,
Summer/Fall 2000, at 5.
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THE MIDEAST

1. Lebanon
At the end of January, and again in July, the U.N. Security Council extended for six
months the mandate of its United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)3 4 In June,
Israel unilaterally withdrew its troops from territory occupied as a security buffer zone in
southern Lebanon since 1978, allowing U.N. peacekeepers finally to take up positions there
and begin patrolling the border later in the summer." Efforts to link the withdrawal to a
6
peace agreement between Israel and Syria, however, were not successful.
2. Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip
Meanwhile, prospects for a settlement of the ongoing conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians seemed to wax and wane during the year. In February, PLO leader Yasir Arafat
broke off on-going negotiations with Israeli President Ehud Barak. The two met again in
March at Sharm el-Sheikh to revive talks that continued in various settings until fall. On
September 28, 2000, however, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon made a highly publicized visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, sparking violent protests that resulted in
hundreds of deaths, mostly Palestinian, over the next several months.37 Following a U.N.
Security Council resolution condemning the violence and urging an immediate resumption
of negotiations," 8 Barak and Arafat met once again on October 17, 2000 at a summit in
Egypt led by President Clinton, but the cease-fire agreed to there never took hold. 9 Continued negotiations sponsored by the Clinton administration had by year's end yielded no
agreement.4°
D.

EUROPE

1. Kosovo
Despite recurring ethnic violence inside Kosovo, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), established in June 1999,41 worked throughout the
year 2000 to restore law and order and to reestablish an administrative infrastructure. 4' At

34. S.C. Res. 1288, U.N. SCOR, 4095th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1288 (2000), available at http://
www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/1288e.pdf; S.C. Res. 1310, U.N. SCOR, 4177th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1310
(2000), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/1310e.pdf.
35. See Christopher S. Wren, U.N. Clears Way for Peacekeepers in Southern Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
2000; Key Dates in UN Efforts to Deploy in South Lebanon, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 4, 2000.

36. These developments are spelled out in some detail in Nicholas Blanford, Post-Israel Stability in Southern
Lebanon, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REV., Oct. 1, 2000.

37. See, e.g., Lee Hockstader & Howard Schneider, Cease-Firein Mideast Collapses;New ClashesErupt After
ParisTalks, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2000, at Al.
38. S.C. Res. 1322, U.N. SCOR, 4205th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1322 (2000), available at http://
www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/1322e.pdf.
39. See Deborah Sontag, Cease-FireAccord Reached, Israel Agrees to Pullback; Palestiniansto Curb Riots, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2000.

40. See Tracy Wilkinson & Mary Curtius, Mideast Peace Prospects Unraveled as Acrimony Grew Diplomnay,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2000, at Al 0.
41. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999), available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99scl 244.htm.
42. See generally What is UNMIK?, availableat http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/unmik12 (lastvisited
June 11, 2001); Chronology: UN Interim Administration in Kosovo, available at http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/
news/kos30day (last visitedJune 11, 2001).
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the end of the year, the Secretary-General was able to report that UNMIK had achieved
one of its key objectives, with the holding of municipal elections throughout Kosovo on
4
October 28, 2000. 1
Supporting the efforts of UNMIK, a NATO-led international security force of 44,000
troops (KFOR) worked to prevent renewed fighting, demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation
Army, establish a secure environment for refugees, and monitor Kosovo's borders.- President Clinton authorized the deployment of some 7,500 combat-equipped U.S. troops with
KFOR in Eastern Kosovo, and another 1,000 supporting military personnel in neighboring
Macedonia, Greece, and Albania45
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2001 approves expenditures for peacekeeping operations in Kosovo of $1.65 billion, but it authorizes the president to waive that
limit if he certifies that the waiver is "necessary in the national interests of the United
States" and if he reports specific reasons for the additional funding to Congress. 6 The same
Act requires the president to establish, by May 31, 2001, "militarily significant benchmarks
for conditions that would achieve a sustainable peace in Kosovo and ultimately allow for
the withdrawal of the United States military presence in Kosovo." 47 It also directes the
President to develop a "comprehensive political-military strategy for addressing the political, economic, humanitarian, and military issues in the Balkans," as well as "near-term, midterm, and long-term objectives in the region," and to report both strategy and objectives
48
to Congress at six-month intervals.
The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act
for FY 2001 provided $100 million in assistance to Serbia, but none of the funds can be
delivered after March 31, 2001, unless the president has determined that the government
of Yugoslavia is cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, is
honoring its commitments under the Dayton Accords, and is pursuing policies that reflect
a respect for minority rights and the rule of law. 49 The Act also bars aid to states that have
failed to apprehend and transfer to the Tribunal residents who have been publicly indicted
50
by the Tribunal.
2. European Rapid Reaction Force
At their summit meeting in Nice in early December, European Union leaders approved
a plan for the formation of a 60,000-troop rapid-reaction force that could carry out missions
in which NATO declined to be involved." According to the plan, to be implemented by

43. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo,
U.N. Doc. S/2000/1196 (2000), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dh/docs/s20001196.pdf.
44. KFOR was authorized by the same Security Council resolution that established UNMIK.
45. See Letter from the President on Kosovo (une 16, 2000), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/06/
2000-06-16-text-of-letter-from-the-president-on-kosovo.html. To the same effect, see Letterfrom the President
on KFOR (Dec. 18, 2000) (reporting a reduction in U.S. troops in Kosovo to 5,600), available at http:I/
cinton6.nara.gov/2000/12/2000-12-18-letter-from-the-president-on-kfor.html.
46. National Defense Authorization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 1005, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A-603
to 1654A-605 (2000).
47. Id. § 1212(a), 114 Stat. 1654A-806 to 1654A-807.
48. Id. §§ 1212(b)-(d), 114 Stat. 1654A-807 to 1654A-808.
49. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106429, § 594, 114 Stat. 1900, 1900A-60 (2000).
50. Id. § 564(d), 114 Stat. 1900A-48.
51. See Keith B. Richburg, European Military Force to Cooperatewith NATO, WASH. PosT, Dec. 9, 2000.
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2003, the EU force would depend on NATO for its command structure, planning, and
intelligence, as well as for troops and equipment. Details remain to be worked out, however.
NATO members were divided on whether to grant EU access to NATO planning, or to
allow NATO to control EU planning, or to give non-NATO members access to NATO
assets.52 U.S. officials worried that such an EU force might undermine the integrity of the
NATO alliance.
E. AsIA

1.Afghanistan
Efforts continued during the year to isolate and put pressure on the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan. Most importantly, in mid-December the U.N. Security Council adopted a
resolution condemning the Taliban's sheltering of terrorists, and calling specifically for it
to surrender Usama bin Laden." The resolution imposed an embargo on non-humanitarian
flights into the country and a strict ban on arms transfers to the Taliban. It also repeated
earlier demands that the Taliban halt violations of human rights, especially discrimination
against women and girls. In addition, the Security Council called for an end to production
and trafficking in opium. And it urged warring factions within Afghanistan to conclude a
cease-fire and establish a multi-ethnic, representative government. At year's end, however,
these measures appeared to have had little effect.
2. East Timor
In February, an Australian-led multinational force handed over military control to the
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). s4 The job of
UNTAET, which includes some 9,000 troops and observers, as well as 1,640 civilian police,
is to administer the former Indonesian territory until it is strong and stable enough to
become fully independent. The United States contributed only a handful of members to
UNTAET, but it established a "rotational presence" through temporary deployments, including ship visits, to provide humanitarian and civic assistance to East Timor's citizens,
and it sent about thirty military personnel to support those activities." The foreign operations appropriations bill for FY 2001, enacted in November, conditioned military aid to
Indonesia on the president's determination that the Indonesian government is prosecuting
violations of human rights by members of its armed forces and militia groups, allowing
displaced persons and refugees to return to East Timor, and not impeding the activities of
UNTAET.56
52. See William Drozdiak, EuropeansQuestion Bus's Views on NATO, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2000.
53. S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4251st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (2000), available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/.
54. UNTAET was established by the U.N. Security Council in S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 4057th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999), availableathttp://www.un.org/peace/etimor/docs/9931277E.htm.Seegenerally
East Timor-UNTAET Background,available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB (last visitedJune 11,
2001).
55. The U.S. deployments are reported in two letters, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," from

the president to congressional leaders on Feb. 28, 2000, http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000-02-25-letter-to-thecongress-on-us-military-forces-to-east-timor.html

(last visited Mar. 25, 2001), and Aug. 25, 2000, http://

clinton6.nara.gov/2000/08/2000-08-28-test-of-a-letter-from-the-president-on-interfet.html
25, 2001).

(last visited Mar.

56. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106429, § 579, 114 Stat. 1900A-55.
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II. Arms Control
A.

UNITED STATEs-RussIA INITIATIVES

The year 2000 was, in terms of international agreements to control weapons of mass
destruction, one of the most uneventful in recent memory. Only one formal bilateral agreement between the United States and Russia was approved, and ongoing negotiations did
not materially progress. The most important development was Russia's ratification in May
of the START II Treaty." Russian approval was conditioned, however, upon U.S. Senate
approval of the 1997 START 1EProtocol," which would extend the treaty's deadline to
2007, and clarify the distinction under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 9 between
permitted theater missile defense systems and actual strategic defenses. Senate leaders have
made it clear that the START II Protocol will not be approved, and the Clinton White
House refused to submit it for consideration, effectively putting implementation of START
H[ on hold pending formulation of the new Bush Administration's policy on the ABM Treaty.
Russian ratification of START I did open the door for formal START I discussions.
Indeed, Russian President Putin called for reducing deployed strategic-nuclear arsenals to
1,500 warheads, instead of the 2,000-2,500 level agreed to at the 1997 Helsinki Summit.60
On September 6, 2000, Presidents Clinton and Putin, meeting at the United Nations Millennium Summit in New York, agreed to the "strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative,"
committing the United States and Russia to an extended range of existing bilateral measures. 61 Both presidents expressed continued support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty and pledged to continue to work toward new arms control objectives, including a
fissile material cutoff treaty and a START III agreement. They also agreed to six specific
initiatives: (1) bilateral discussions on emerging ballistic missile threats; (2) joint theater
missile defense (TMD) exercises; (3) continuing work on the Joint Data Exchange Center,
intended to house a U.S.-Russian early-warning information center; (4) completion of a
bilateral agreement on pre-launch notification of ballistic missile launches; (5) continued
work on a "global" approach to missile non-proliferation; and (6) expert meetings to consider expanded cooperation on Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification and
6
warhead safety.

57. Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Jan. 3, 1993, U.S.-Russ., S.
RusstAN NEWS,
TRErAT Doc. No. 103-1 (1993). See Putin Signs START II Ratification Bill Into Law, INTERFAx
May 4, 2000. The START II Ratification Bill was passed by the Russian State Duma on April 14, 2000, and
signed into law by President Vladimir Putin on May 4, 2000.
58. See Russian Duma Ratifies START 11, CURRENT DIGEST OF THE POsT-SovIET PRESS, May 17, 2000; Ilya
Bulavinov, Shifting the Blame-START II May Not Go into Effect, KoMMER ANT, Apr. 18, 2000.
59. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T.
3425.
60. See Igor Gedilaghine, Duma Ratifies START II, Putin Issues U.S. With Arms Control Warning, AGENCE
FRANcE-PRESsE, Apr. 14, 2000; Alexander G. Higgins, U.S., Russian Negotiators Ready to Kick Off START II"
Officials, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 14, 2000; Russia Ready to Cut StrategicArsenals to 1,500 Warbeads- Putin (Part
2), INTERFAx NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 14, 2000.
61. See Clinton, Putin DiscussMissile Defense, DEUTSCHE PRESsE-AGENTUR, Sept. 6, 2000.
62. See International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: U.S.-Russian Strategic

Stability CooperationInitiative, Sept. 6, 2000, available at http://www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/poVarms/storie:;/
00090702.htm; Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, StrategicStability CooperationInitiativeBetween
the United States of America and Russian Federation Text of the Joint Statement and Implementation
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A provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 diminished
prospects for nuclear weapons reductions, however. The Act prohibits the United States
from reducing its deployed strategic nuclear arsenal below START I levels of about 6,000
warheads until START II enters into force.63 Congress adopted this limitation in 1997 to
pressure Russia to ratify START H. 64 The FY 2001 Defense Authorization Act also requires
the submission of a comprehensive nuclear posture review along with the Quadrennial
Defense Review in December 2001.65 The nuclear posture review will examine the role of
the U.S. nuclear arsenal, its size, and the weapons complex needed to sustain it. Notably,
the review will address the relationships among nuclear deterrence policy, targeting strategy,
and arms control objectives. The legislation also calls on the Secretaries of Defense and
Energy to submit a long-term plan for modernizing the strategic triad of bombers and landbased and submarine-based ballistic missiles. 6 Both secretaries must also undertake a study
relating to the destruction of hardened and deeply buried targets-an oblique reference
intended to facilitate research into the development of new low-yield nuclear weapons. 67
On November 13, 2000, President Putin announced Russia's readiness for "radical progress" on nuclear disarmament, suggesting that the United States and Russia cut their
deployed strategic arsenals to 1,500 warheads each by 2008. 6 8 This figure is based on the
legal framework developed for the START I and 1Hagreements. Putin called for retaining
and strengthening the ABM Treaty, but he also proposed "wide ranging cooperation" on
theater missile defenses. He further suggested that the Joint Data Exchange Center being
established in Moscow to share early-warning information on missile launches 69 could serve
as a component of such cooperation.70
One week later, the United Nations General Assembly adopted forty-eight resolutions
and one decision dealing with disarmament." One resolution, supported by Russia and
approved by a vote of 88-5, with sixty-six abstentions, urges continued compliance with
and strengthening of the ABM Treaty." Another calls for early signature and ratification

Plan (Sept. 6, 2000), available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/09/2000-09-06-joint-statement-on-strategicstability-cooperation-initiative.htnl.
63. National Defense Authorization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 1043, 114 Stat. 1654A-263 (2000).
64. National Defense Authorization Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 1302, 111 Stat. 1629, 1948-1951
(1997).
65. National Defense Authorization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 1041(c), 114 Stat. 1654A-262
(2000).
66. Id. § 1042.
67. Id.
68. See Henry Meyer, Putin Proposes Deep Cuts in US-RussianNuclearArsenals, ACENCE FRANcE-PRESSE, Nov.
13, 2000; Vladimir Isachenkov, Putin Proposes New Deeper Nuclear Cutsfor Russia and the United States, AssoCIATEDPRESS, Nov. 13, 2000.
69. See Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Memorandum of Agreement Between the United
States of America and the Russian Federation on the Establishment of a Joint Centerfor the Exchange of Datafrom
Early Warning System and Notifications of Missile Launches (June 4, 2000) (Moscow), available at http://
clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Europe-0005/factsheets/fs--joint-warning-center.html.
70. See Putin Launches Nuclear Disarmament Initiative (condensed text), CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET
PREss/KRAsNAYA ZVEZDA, Nov. 15, 2000.
71. Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly at Its 55th Session on the Reports of the First Committee
(Disarmament and International Security), Nov. 20, 2000, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/
r55cl.htm.
72. Id., Agenda Item 73, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/33B, available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/55/
a55r033.pdf.
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of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT),7" as well as unilateral reductions of non4
strategic nuclear weapons in a process leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons.
On December 14, 2000, the United States and four former Soviet republics signed an
agreement to end round-the-clock monitoring of missile plants in Utah and Russia, marking
the successful conclusion of verification arrangements of the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. 7
Finally, a December 16, 2000 agreement is meant to facilitate the exchange of earlywarning information about planned missile and space launches. 76 A Memorandum of Understanding on Notifications of Missile Launches requires notice of ballistic missile
launches with a range or altitude greater than 500 kilometers. For space launches, notification is the norm, but there are exceptions for national security. For satellites forced from
orbit and geophysical experiments that could interfere with early-warning radars, notification is voluntary. The new agreement applies to a far broader range of activities than
earlier accords.

B.

MULTILATERAL NON-PROLIFERATION

No major non-proliferation initiatives were negotiated or entered into force. The Ad
Hoc Group of States Party to the Biological Weapons Convention 7 (BWC) convened in
Geneva from July 10 to August 4, 2000 for its Twentieth session since 1995 to work on a
protocol to strengthen the BWC. The Group reported no substantial progress, although
it modified certain negotiating procedures and reaffirmed its commitment to have a new
protocol drafted by 2001.8
The 2000 Review Conference for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) produced no new formal measures. At the Conference's beginning in April, however, Russian
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov urged consideration of the Global Control System for the
Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology (GCS), saying that it could offer a
"real alternative to the destruction of the ABM Treaty."'79 The GCS would increase transparency and reduce the risk of miscalculation or misunderstanding by requiring nations to
provide notification of pending missile or space-launch vehicle tests. To nations that forswore the use of missiles as delivery mechanisms for weapons of mass destruction, the GCS
would provide security assurances against the hostile use of missile systems and assistance
from the U.N. Security Council if such weapons were used against them, as well as assis-

73. Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, openedforsignature Sept. 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1439.
74. Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly, supra note 71, Agenda Item 81, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/
41, available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/55/a55rO41.pdf.
75. See United States and FourEx-Soviet Republics Sign Agreement on INF Treaty, AssociATED PRESS, Dec. 14,
2000.
76. Memorandum of Understanding on Notifications of Missile Launches, Dec. 16, 2000, available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/mou-msllaunch.html#toc.
77. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T.583,1015 U.N.T.S.163.
78. See Procedural Report and Rolling Text, Ad Hoc Group 20th Session, availableat http://www.brad.ac.uk/
acad/sbtwc/ahg52/ahg52.htm; Working Papers (AHG 20tb Session), available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/
sbtwc/ahg52wp/whg52wp.htm (last visited June 11, 2001).
79. Statement by Igor S. Ivanov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, Apr. 25, 2000,
available at http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/revcon2000/nuk-O0revcon-gen-russia.htm.
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tance in the peaceful uses of space. While supporting the multilateral exchange of testlaunch data, Washington expressed concern that the GCS might "legitimize the missile
programs of rogue states," and that security assurances for countries that renounce their
missile programs would be "unfeasible."10 United States officials also argued against using
"one-size-fits-all" incentives at the expense of targeted bilateral efforts, and they worried
that aid for peaceful space programs might be applied to military missile programs. Finally,
these officials insisted that the existing Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)0 ' is
the only forum in which these issues should be discussed.
The Review Conference issued its Final Document 2 in May. It expressed the nuclear
powers' commitment to an "unequivocal undertaking... to accomplish the total elimination
of their nuclear arsenals""5 and acknowledged a "principle of irreversibility" in reductions
of weapons.8 4 The signers committed to reductions in tactical nuclear weapons, as well as
to "concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons
systems," and a "diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies."85 They also
called for the preservation and strengthening of the ABM Treaty as a "cornerstone of
strategic stability,8' 6 and once again urged Israel to join the NPT 87
Efforts to fulfill disarmament obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) s proceeded uneventfully. On December 30, 1999, the Commerce Department
issued regulations requiring civilian U.S. facilities that produce, process, consume, import,
or export toxic chemicals or precursors covered by the CWC to submit initial declarations
of their activities by March 30, 2001, and to allow international verification activities. s 9The
regulations effectively ended more than two years of U.S. non-compliance with the 1993
treaty. The United States expected to submit its industry declarations for Schedule 1 (the
highest "risk" category) and Schedule 2 facilities by April 28, 2000, three years after the
convention's entry into force, and inspections were expected to begin the following month.
The U.S. will submit declarations for Schedule 3 facilities and unscheduled chemicals facilities at a later date. 90
Three developments threatened the sanctions regime imposed on Iraq in the wake of the
Persian Gulf War: (1) a growing disillusionment with the efficacy of the sanctions;
(2) rampant smuggling of oil; and (3) Iraq's disruption of its own oil supply in protest of

80. See Matthew Rice, Russia Proposes Global Regime on Missile Proliferation, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, May
2000.
81. The Missile Control Technology Regime was established in 1987 between the United States and its
G-7 partners. See Department of State, Missile Control Technology Regime: Guidelines for Sensitive MissileRelevant Transfers, available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/mtcr-anx.html.
82. 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:
Final Document, availableat http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/finaldoc.html.
83. Id., "Practical Step" 6.
84. Id., "Practical Step" 5.
85. Id., "Practical Step" 9.
86. Id. para. 16.
87. See Matthew Rice, NPT Review Conference Finds Consensus, Issues Document, ARMs CONTROL ToDAY,June
2000.
88. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical
Weapons and Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993).
89. Bureau of Export Administration, Department of Commerce, Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations
(Supplementary Information), 64 Fed. Reg. 73,743 (1999).
90. See Seth Brugger, U.S. Issues ChemicalIndusny Regulation, ARMs CONTROL TODAY, Jan/Feb. 2000.
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the sanctions. The humanitarian consequences of a decade of economic sanctions led to
the highly publicized resignation of Hans von Sponeck, U.N. Humanitarian Co-ordinator
for Iraq, and a visit to Iraq by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, the first by a head of
state since the Gulf War.91Humanitarian flights into Iraq by France95 Russia, 93 Egypt, Syria,
Turkey, and other Arab countries" were condemned by the United States9 as violations of
the air traffic embargo established early in the Gulf War by U.N. Security Council Resolution 670.96 In July, Britain accused Iran and other Gulf states of helping Iraq bypass other
U.N. sanctions, through an elaborate multimillion-dollar smuggling operation, to ship oil
through the Gulf to markets in Asia and the West.97 Another smaller-scale operation was
conducted north into Turkey and west into Syria. Both provided Iraq with illicit revenues
to revive its military infrastructure.
In April, the U.N. Security Council approved a new commission, staffed only by United
Nations personnel, to carry out arms inspections in Iraq in accordance with its 1991 resolution ending the Persian Gulf War.98 An earlier team of UNSCOM inspectors was withdrawn in December 1998, following Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's refusal to cooperate
with them. 99 Although various economic sanctions are to remain in place until Iraq can be
certified free of long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction, Saddam continued
his opposition to the inspections throughout 2000.100 Concern about Iraqi weapons programs grew with a report that two of the factories bombed and badly damaged by the Desert
Fox strikes in 1998 had been rebuilt, and that production of chlorine had resumed at a third
factory.'01 UNSCOM had monitored all three because of their previous involvement in
making chemical or biological agents. The Security Council nevertheless twice extended
its "oil for food" program, allowing continued oil sales at a high level and import of a
lengthening list of civilian goods.10 At the beginning of December, however, Iraq unilat91. See Leon Barkho, Chavez Heads to Iraq, Breaking Its Isolation, Annoying Washington, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Aug. 10, 2000.
92. See Christophe de Roquefeuil, US Slams FranceOver Iraq Flight,AGENcE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 22, 2000;
Organizersof New FrenchAid Flight to Iraq Reect Top-Level Pressure,AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 27, 2000.
93. See Russian Plane Arrives at a Suddenly Busy Airport in Baghdad,N.Y. TIMEs/AssOCIATED PRESS,
Sept.
24, 2000.
94. See US Says Syria, Egypt Violate UN Sanctions with Iraq Flights, Warns Sudan, AGENCE FRANcE-PRESSE,
Oct. 11, 2000.
95. See Roquefeuil, supra note 92.
96. S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 2943rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/670 (1990), availableathttp://www.un.org/
Docs/scres/1990/670e.pdf.
97. See Richard Beeston, GulfStates Help Smugglers Sustain Saddam, OTTAWA CITIZEN, July 5, 2000.
98. See Security Council Approves New OrganizationalPlan for MonitoringIraqi Disarmament, DAILY HIGHLIGHTS, Apr. 13, 2000, available at http://www.un.org/cgi-bin/dh.pl#55; Barbara Crossette, Security Council
Approves New Arms Inspection Agency for Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2000.
99. See Barbara Crossette & Steven Lee Myers, U.N. Readies Team to Check Weapons Heldby the Iraqis,N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2000.
100. See Barbara Crossette, IraqSeeks Talks with U.N. Chiefon Arms-Inspection Impasse, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
2000.
101. See Steven Lee Myers & Eric Schmitt, IraqRebuilt Weapon Factories, U.S. Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
22, 2001. Further concern was raised by publication in November 2000 of KmDE ABD AL-AREAS HAMZAH ET
AL., SADDAM'S BOMBMAKER: THE TERRIFYING INSIDE STORY OF THE IRAQI NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

(2000), revealing further details of Saddam's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. Khidhir
Hamza was director general of the secret Iraqi nuclear weapons program.
102. S.C. Res. 1302, U.N. SCOR, 4152nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1302 (2000), available at http://
www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/1302e.pdf; S.C. Res. 1330, U.N. SCOR, 4241st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1330
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erally halted its oil exports and condemned the U.N. sanctions committee for blocking its
exports and for refusing a fifty-cent-per-barrel surcharge that would be paid into an account
free of U.N. control.
C.

0 3

PROTECTION OF RUSSIAN WEAPONS MATERIALS AND TECHNOLOGY

United States programs to address problems associated with Russian nuclear material
proceeded with modest successes and some new initiatives. In November, pursuant to the
Material Protection, Control and Accounting Program, the Department of Energy announced completion of an effort to consolidate and secure approximately ten metric tons
of weapons-usable nuclear material-enough for more than 500 nuclear bombs-at the
Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant in Siberia, Russia."l 4
The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program is designed to engage former Soviet
biological weapons scientists in non-military partnerships with national laboratories. Injuly,
the Department of Energy announced four consumer and environmental projects initiated
with investments from various public and private U.S. institutions. The largest of these will
establish a sustainable ecological center to enable scientists to pursue the development of
novel bioactive compounds and to market new products and services involving the use of
those compounds. Other projects are intended to develop new products to prevent food
contamination, to study methods for improving the shelf life and effectiveness of bioactive
materials, and to develop new biological alternatives to chemical pesticides." °0 Announcement of these programs followed a March statement that the DOE and its Russian counterpart will develop a center in Zheleznogorsk for testing advanced equipment and technologies for remediation of high-level radioactive waste tanks.l°6
The Nuclear Cities Initiative is designed to reduce the size of the Russian nuclear weapons complex and to help redirect the work of Russian scientists and engineers in the closed
nuclear cities to alternative, non-military activities. In FY 2000, under significant pressure
from Republican congressional leadership, Congress cut the program's $15 million budget
in half, asking DOE to demonstrate results before providing additional funding. But in FY
2001, the budget was increased from $7.5 million to $27.5 million; $10 million is conditioned on a bilateral agreement under which Russia will close some of its four nuclear
warhead assembly/disassembly facilities within five years. 07 In March, DOE's Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory signed two contracts to assist Russian weapons experts from
the closed city of Snezhinsk in their transition to civilian employment. The contracts call

(2000), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/1330e.pdf. See Barbara Crossette, "Oilfor Food" Program for Iraq Extended by Security Council, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2000; Barbara Crossette, Security Council Lets
Iraq Spend Oil Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2000.
103. See Barbara Crossette & Neela Banerjee, Iraq Halts Oil Exports, Blasts UN Sanctions Committee, DEUTSCHEPRESsE-AGENTUR, Dec. 1, 2000.
104. See U.S. Dept. of Energy, Ten Metric Tons of Russian Nuclear MaterialSecured(Nov. 17, 2000), available
at http://www.nn.doe.gov/mpca/news.htm.

105. See U.S. Dept. of Energy, Consumer and EnvironmentalPrjects with Former Soviet Biological Weapons
Scientists and U.S. Industry Partners(uly, 24, 2000), available at http://www.energy.gov/14QPress/releasesO0/
julpr/pr00191 .htmn.
106. See U.S. Dept. of Energy, U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Closed Nuclear City Expanded (Mar. 10, 2000),

available at http://www.energy.gov/HQPress/releases/00/marpr/prOO067.htm.
107. See Oleg Bukharin, Frank Von Hippel & Sharon K. Weiner, Conversion and Job Creation in Russia's
Closed Nuclear Cities (Nov. 2000), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-cees/arms/obninskl .pdf.
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for development of oil production technology and improvements to Russia's fiber optic
cables for the commercial market.s In November, DOE announced the commissioning of
the Strela Open Computing Center, which will provide commercial research opportunities
to former nuclear weapons specialists in computer software programming and computerassisted engineering and design. This will be the second open computing center created in
9
Russia under the Nuclear Cities Initiative.1
Two complementary initiatives focused on problems associated with plutonium reprocessing. In February, the Department of Energy announced that it reached an agreement
"in principle" to suspend Russia's reprocessing of civilian reactor-generated spent fuel to
produce weapons-usable plutonium, fulfilling a U.S. policy objective hailing back to President Carter." 0 In the new agreement, the U.S. offered $100 million to fund bilateral threat
reduction efforts in Russia (in addition to the $250 million DOE currently spends on such
programs), including $45 million for spent fuel storage and material protection, control,
and accounting; $20 million for joint long-term research on "developing nuclear fuel cycle
options that maximize technological barriers to proliferation";"' $30 million for new efforts
to safeguard military-origin material; and $5 million for research into long-term spent fuel
storage options.
Perhaps the more important development was the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, signed in September, establishing U.S. and Russian commitments each
to dispose of thirty-four metric tons of excess weapons plutonium."2 At the Group of Eight
(G-8) summit in Okinawa in July, the participating nations announced an agreement to
develop a plan to finance Russian disposition of weapons-origin plutonium, as well as a
"multilateral framework" to coordinate cooperation on the issue.I 3 The September Agreement provides a timeline for the design and construction of industrial-scale facilities to
convert excess weapons plutonium to mixed oxide fuel, and provides for monitoring and
inspection."' 4 The United States will provide up to $400 million of the estimated $1.7 billion
cost of the Russian program, in addition to the $4 billion the United States will spend to
meet its own commitments. The agreement is contingent, however, upon Russia's securing
5
additional international assistance."

108. See U.S. Dept. of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy Announces Russian Contracts (Mar. 21, 2000),
available at http://www.energy.gov/HQPress/releasesO00/marpr/pr00078.htn.
109. See U.S. Dept. of Energy, Computing Center Commissions Non-Weapons Related Yobs (Nov. 20, 2000),
available at http://www.energy.gov/HQPress/releases00/novpr/pr00289.htn. The first Open Computing Center was inaugurated at Sarov in the fall of 1999.
110. See Judith Miller, Moscow Takes Step to Ease U.S. Fearson Plutonium Use, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2000, at
Al.
111. Id.
112. Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Russian Federation
Concerning Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Requiredfor Defense Purposes and
Related Cooperation (Sept. 1, 2000), availableat http://www.doe-md.com or http://twilight.saic.com/md/DOCS/
PDF2.ASP?mDoc'pudispagree.pdf.
113. See G8 Communiqui, Okinawa (July 23, 2000), available at http://www.g8kyushu-okinawa.go.jp/e/
documents/commu.html; The White House, Fact Sheet: Disposition of United States and Russian Federation
Weapons-Grade Plutonium (uly 21, 2000), available at http://www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/
00060401.htm.
114. See The White House, Vice-President Gore Signs U.S.-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition
Agreement (Sept. 1, 2000), availableat http://twilight.saic.com/md/bilatagreementl.htm.
115. Id.
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NON-PROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROLS

Non-proliferation developments in 2000 included several changes to U.S. export control
policy and diplomatic initiatives to restrict other nations' sales of weapons of mass destruction. This activity took place against a backdrop of: (1) U.S. efforts to facilitate its exports
of items with only limited proliferation potential, and (2) growing frustration with the
unwillingness of other states to comply with trade sanctions. The resulting measures reflect
not so much a clear non-proliferation strategy as an attempt to harmonize conflicting
policies.
In May, the Clinton administration proposed the Defense Trade Security Initiative 16 seventeen measures to facilitate shipment of weapons and technology to NATO countries,
Japan, and Australia."' The initiative is intended to expedite arms export decisions, relax
or waive export-licensing requirements, and reduce the number of licenses needed for exporting weapons. Rather than licensing each component or company that is party to an
arms export deal, for example, the U.S. government could issue one license to cover an
entire program or project. In addition, the government may provide advance consent to
retransfers among countries that sign blanket end-use assurances. Countries may also negotiate bilateral agreements with Washington to allow specified foreign firms to import
unclassified U.S. arms and data without a license, provided such countries raise their own
export controls to match U.S. standards. Another provision relaxes restrictions on companies sharing technical data.
On October 6, 2000, President Clinton signed into law the Security Assistance Act of
2000.11 The Act requires that bilateral agreements under the May initiative be binding,
and that recipient nations' export controls be "comparable" with U.S. laws. u9 Unlike the
May initiative, however, the Security Assistance Act calls for prior written U.S. approval of
the re-export of U.S.-supplied items to third countries. 2 0
Consistent with these efforts to relax restrictions on the export of items that could be
valuable to proliferators, the White House announced planned revisions of controls on
shipments of high-performance computers (HPC) to states raising proliferation concerns,
such as India, Pakistan, China, former Soviet states, and Middle Eastern countries. 2 ' The
changes more than double the previous limit on processing speed and eliminate the distinction between civilian and military end users, because advances in computer technology
have made access to computer processors relatively easy. Some of the latest changes require
congressional approval and therefore will not take effect immediately.
Iran's nuclear weapons program, and especially Russia's support for that program, received considerable attention in the year 2000. In March, both houses of Congress unan-

116. Bureau of Political Military Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, Exports of CommercialCommunicationsSatellite
Components, Systems, Parts,Accessories andAssociatedTechnicalData, 65 Fed. Reg. 34089-01 (2000). The Initiative
is based on authority provided in § 1309(a) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2000
and 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-513 (1999).
117. See Bureau of Political Military Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, Seventeen Agreed Proposals of the Defense
Trade Security Initiative (May 26, 2000), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau-pm/dtc/
fs_000526_proposals.html.
118. Security Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-280, 114 Stat. 845 (2000).
119. Id.§ 102 (a)(2)(A), 114 Stat. 847.
120. Id.§ 102 (a)(2)(A)(i), 114 Stat. 847.
121. Bureau of Export Administration, Dept. of Commerce, Revisions to License Exception CTP,65 Fed. Reg.
60,852 (2000).
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imously passed the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000,122 authorizing the president to take
punitive action against individuals or organizations that provide material aid to Iran's weapons of mass destruction programs. 23 Notably, the legislation substantially cuts U.S. funding
to Russian agencies responsible for the International Space Station project unless Russia
demonstrates a commitment to prevent aid to Iran's weapons programs.12 4 The president
must submit to Congress a list of entities that provide material assistance to such programs. " ' A presidential decision not to impose punitive measures must also be reported to
26
Congress.
Despite the new law, Russia announced its withdrawal late in the year from a 1995 agreement not to sell arms to Iran, leading the Clinton administration to warn of sanctions if
Russia enters into new arms agreements with Iran. 27 In October, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearingszs to determine whether the 1995 agreement undercut
either the 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act' 29or the Foreign Assistance Act of
1996.110 The former requires that sanctions be imposed on countries supplying Iran or Iraq
with advanced conventional weapons. The latter prohibits the United States from providing
foreign assistance to countries that deliver lethal equipment to states sponsoring terrorism.
Administration officials responded by asserting that the equipment Russia had transferred
to Iran was not destabilizing, that the transfer would not threaten the military balance in
the Persian Gulf, and that no commitment had been made not to impose sanctions required
by U.S. law. "' At year's end, Russia had not yet concluded any new arms deals with Iran,
and U.S. and Russian experts had agreed to discuss the matter further."2
China's export of ballistic missile components and technology to Iran, Pakistan, North
Korea, and Libya also came under scrutiny, " ' leading to China's formal agreement, on
122. Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-178, 114 Stat. 38 (2000).
123. Id. § 3(a)-(d).
124. Id. § 6(a).
125. Id. § 2(a) and (b).
126. Id. § 4(a).
127. See Russia Terminates Agreement with U.S. on Suspension ofMilitary Cooperation with Iran. U.S. Threatens
Russia with Economic Sanctions, RussIAN BUSINESS MONITOR, Nov. 24, 2000; David Hoffman, Russia Dismisses
Threat of Sanctions, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2000; Wade Boese, Russia to Bow Out of 1995 Deal Banning Arms
Trade With Iran, ARMsCONTROL TODAY, Dec. 2000. In a 1995 agreement with Vice-President Gore, Russian
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin promised that Russia would not sign any new arms deals with Iran, would
conclude all current orders by the end of 1999, and would provide information to the United States concerning
all pending weapons orders.
128. A Review of Gore-Chernomyrdin Diplomacy: Hearing before the Joint Subcomm. on European Affairs and
Subcomm. on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. (2000),
available at http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/hrg102400.html.
129. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2315 (1992).
130. Defense and Security Assistance Improvements, Pub. L. No. 104-164, 110 Stat. 1421 (1996).
131. See Testimony ofJohn P. Barker, Deputy Assistant Secretaryof Statefor Nonproliferation Controls,andJoseph
M. DeThomas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Statefor Regional Nonproliferation,Before the Senate ForeignRelations
Committee, 106th Cong. (Oct. 25, 2000), availableat http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/hrg102400.html.
132. See Russia Informs U.S. Delegation on New Arms Control Policy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 8, 2000; U.S.,
Russian Delegation Wrap Up ConventionalArms Talks, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 7, 2000; Russia PledgesNot to SelV
Arms to Iran, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 7, 2000, at A16; Christophe de Roquefeuil, U.S., Russia to Hold Consultationon
Iran, Nuclear Arms, AGENcE FRANcE-PRESsE, Nov. 29, 2000; Eli J. Lake, Albright, Ivanov Agree to Discuss 1995
Arms Pact, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 27, 2000.
133. Nonproliferation Center, Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congresson the Acqui.sition of Technology Relating to WMD and Advanced Conventional Munitions Oan.-June 1999), available at http://
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian feb_2000.html.
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November 21, not to export items restricted by the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR).1 4 In exchange, the Clinton administration immediately announced that it would
resume processing applications for U.S. companies to launch satellites on Chinese rockets
(which had been suspended since February), and that it would not pursue sanctions against
China for past missile technology transfers.' However, the United States will continue to
impose sanctions on entities that received Chinese assistance. China announced that it
would soon issue a list of missile-related and dual-use items whose export will require a
government license.3 6 According to the State Department, China's new pledge indicates
progress, but proof of its commitment will be found in the implementation. '"
China also figured in the June settlement of a dispute between the State Department and
the Lockheed Martin Corporation over that company's alleged transfer of technical reports
detailing sensitive rocket information to the Chinese Asia Satellite Telecommunications
Corporation, a company partly owned by the Chinese government. Concerns were raised
when the Chinese Long March rocket twice failed in 1992 to deliver satellites on target,
but then successfully launched a satellite in 1995 after assistance from Lockheed. Although
it avoided having to admit or deny guilt, Lockheed will pay $8 million in fines over four
years and spend $5 million to upgrade its internal security procedures, the highest civil
penalty ever imposed under the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations. "' The Chinese Foreign Ministry characterized the charges as "entirely
groundless."'' 19
At year's end, the president signed legislation reauthorizing the 1979 Export Administration Act and increasing the penalties that U.S. exporters could face for illegally exporting
dual-use equipment and technologies.-' 4
11. Terrorism
In the wake of concerns about Y2K, initiatives to combat terrorism mostly took the form
of commission reports and agency plans. The National Commission on Terrorism, chaired
by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer Im,issued its report in June.' 4' The Commission concluded
that American policies are basically sound, but it found serious deficiencies in their imple134. See Jane Perlez, China to Stop Selling A-Arms Delivery Systems, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2000; U.S. Waives
Sanctionson China, Imposes Them in Pakistan,Iran,AGENCE FRANCE-PREssE, Nov. 21, 2000; Barry Schweid, State
Department Welcomes Pledge Not to Assist Other Countries on Missiles, AsSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 21, 2000.
135. See Anita Narayan, China-Freezeon Applications to Launch U.S. Satelliteson Chinese Rockets Thaws, CHINA
ONLINE, Nov. 22, 2000; Norman Kempster, U.S. to Skip Sanctions After China Arms Vow; Diplomacy, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2000.
136. Bureau of Nonproliferation, U.S. Dept. of State, Statement byPeople'sRepublic ofChina, ForeignMinistry
Spokesperson (Nov. 21, 2000), available at http://www.state.gov/www/globaVarms/bureanp/001 121_china_
missiles.html; China Opposes ProliferationofMass-Destruction Weapons: Spokesman, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Nov.
21, 2000; Charles Hutzler, China Promises Not to Help Foreign Missile Programs,AsSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 21,
2000.
137. Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Dept. of State, Statement by Acting Assistant Secretary RichardBoucher
(Nov. 21, 2000), available at http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/0011/00112 ldb.html.
138. See David E. Sanger, U.S. Fines Lockheed $13 Million in China Satellite Case, N.Y. TIMEsJune 14,2000.
139. Lockheed Illegal Exports Allegations Roected by China, AFX NEws LIMITED, Apr. 9, 2000; China Reects

U.S. Allegations on Satellite Motors, AGENCE

FRANCE-PRESSE,

Apr. 9, 2000.

140. Increased Penalties for Violations of the Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 106-508,114
Stat. 2360 (2000) (amending 50 U.S.C. App. § 2419).
141. National Commission on Terrorism, Pursuing the Changing Threat of InternationalTerrorism(June 5,
2000), available at http://w3.access.gpo.gov/nct.
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mentation. Calling international terrorism an increasingly dangerous and difficult threat to
America, the Commission recommended stepping up U.S. efforts to collect intelligence, to
disrupt and prosecute terrorist activities, to stanch state and private sources of support for
terrorism, and to ensure that domestic officials at every level of government are prepared
for attacks that could cause mass casualty. It also called for suspension of 1995 CIA guidelines restricting the recruitment of "unsavory sources" for intelligence collection.
The Bremer Commission singled out Iran, Syria and Afghanistan as state sponsors of
terrorism, while Greece and Pakistan were said to be "not cooperating fully on counterterrorism."' 142 It urged Congress promptly to ratify the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and it recommended the negotiation of an
international convention to combat cyberterrorism. On the domestic front, it called for
preparation of a manual to guide implementation of existing legal authorities and determine
whether additional legal authority is needed. The commission stressed that Department of
Defense (DOD) responses to domestic acts of terrorism should be the subject of detailed
plans, including criteria for decisions to transfer command authority to DOD in extraordinary circumstances. It also recommended stricter controls on the possession of critical
pathogens that could contribute to the development of biological weapons.
The Gilmore Commission released its second annual report in December, focusing primarily on managing the consequences of domestic terrorism. 43 It includes five key preventive recommendations to the executive and Congress: (1) crafting a "truly 'national strategy"' in the face of domestic terrorism; (2) empowering a senior authority within the
executive branch for the purposes of planning and preparation; (3) consolidating domestic
terrorism legislation; (4) focusing on state and local concerns and capabilities; and (5) enhancing intelligence, training, operations, and research and development.- 4 Other recommendations include the creation of a National Office for Combating Terrorism, to formulate strategy and review planning within the executive branch, as well as a bipartisan
congressional Special Committee for Combating Terrorism. The Commission stressed that
a comprehensive, functional national strategy should be adequately financed and based on
measurable performance objectives, and it should focus on the full range of threats from
both domestic and international terrorism. In addition, domestic programs should be fully
coordinated with local, state, and federal authorities.
The National Plan for Information Systems Protection 4 was launched in January to
strengthen defenses against emerging threats to the nation's critical infrastructure, computer systems, and networks. The Final Report of the President's Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection'" estimated that by 2002, approximately 19 million people worldwide would be capable of mounting a cyber attack. The first version of the National Plan
focuses on federal efforts to protect the nation's cyber-based infrastructures. Subsequent
versions will address a broader range of state and local capabilities, as provided for under
142. Id.
143. Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction (The Gilmore Commission), Toward a National Strategy to Combat Terrorism (Dec. 15, 2000),
available at http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror2.pdf.
144. See id.
145. The White House, DefiendingAmerica's Cyberspace: National Planfor Information Systems Protection, VerAn Invitation to a Dialogue (Jan. 7, 2000), available at http://www.ciao.gov/CIAODocumentLibrary/
sion 1.0
national-plan%20_-final.pdf.
146. President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, CriticalFoundations: ProtectingAmericas
Infrastructures(Oct. 1997).
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PDD-63.14 ' The Plan aims to balance national security concerns against the preservation
of civil liberties and personal privacy.
The FBI's Strategic Plan: 1998-2003 addresses threats within the sphere of its National
Foreign Intelligence Program. Its objectives are to: (1) identify, prevent, and defeat intelligence operations by any foreign power within the United States or against U.S. interests
abroad that threaten national security; (2) prevent, disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations
before they occur; and (3) deter the unlawful exploitation of emerging technologies by
foreign powers, terrorists, and criminal elements. 14
Congress amended the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in 1996 to allow suits for
damages against nations determined by the Secretary of State to be state sponsors of terrorism.' 49 Suits under this provision resulted in large awards against Iran for its role in the
detention of American hostages in Lebanon in the 1980s and the deaths of American students killed by terrorist bombers in Israel in the mid-1990s, as well as against Cuba for the
shooting down of two civilian aircraft over international waters in 1996. Plaintiffs were
unable to collect on their judgments, however, because almost all assets in this country of
both Iran and Cuba were either blocked by the Treasury Department under sanctions laws
or otherwise held by the U.S. government, and with one modest exception the president
refused to release the assets.5 0 Congress acted again in 1998 to make the blocked assets
available to satisfy these judgments, but it also authorized the president to continue the
blocking in the interest of "national security,"'"' and the president immediately did so." 2
In October 2000, Congress passed the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, 53 directing the
Treasury Secretary to pay compensatory damage awards in certain final and pending suits
against Iran and Cuba out of blocked assets and other fumds held by the government, but
preserving the president's ability to prevent executions or attachments against such assets.
Again, the president immediately exercised his right to do so.1t4 The new measure also
provided for additional payments to states, public agencies, and NGOs for relief to victims
of terrorist acts abroad who are U.S. citizens or employees."5 The law remains unchanged
for future plaintiffs in suits against state sponsors of terrorism, including Libya and Iraq.
After eleven years, thousands of witnesses, and 200,000 bits of evidence, the trial in the
Lockerbie bombing of PanAm Flight 103 finally got underway on May 3, 2000116 at Camp
147. White Paper: The Clinton Administration'sPolity on CriticalInfrastructureProtection:PresidentialDecision
Directive 63 (May 1998), available at http://www.ciao.gov/CIAO-Document_-Library/paper598.hmi.
148. The FBI CounterterrorismProgram:Assessing Threats, Managing Risk, and EstablishingPriorities.Hearing
Bfore the Subcomm. on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and InternationalRelations of the House Government
Reform Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Terry Turchie, Deputy Asst. Director, FBI Counterterrorism
Division).
149. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1211,
1241-1243 (1996), adding 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) and (e)-(g).
150. See Conference Report on H.R. 3244, Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, H.R. Rep.
No. 106-939 (2000), 146 CONG. REC. H8856, H8885-H8886 (2000).
151. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
Tide I, § 117, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-491 to-492 (1998).
152. Presidential Determination No. 99-1, Determination to Waive Requirements Relating to Blocked
Property of Terrorist-List States, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,201 (1998).
153. Pub. L. No. 106-386, §§ 2002-2003, 114 Star. 1464, 1541-1546 (2000).
154. Statement by the President(Oct. 31, 2000), 2000 WL 28278421.
155. Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 2003, 114 Stat. 1543.
156. See Sonia Delesalle, Lockerbie Trial Sets World Legal History, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESsE, May 3, 2000;
Tortuous 11 Years to Bring Lockerbie Bombers to Trial,AGENCE FAcE-PREssE, May 3, 2000; Jerome Socolovsky,
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Zeist, a former U.S. air base in the Netherlands, based on temporary Scottish jurisdiction.
The two defendants, Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah,
were charged with conspiracy to murder, or alternatively, contravention of Sections 2(1)
and (5) of the Scottish Aviation Security Act of 1982.17
In an ongoing criminal prosecution growing out of the bombings of American embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the judge made several notable pre-trial rulings. One
involved a warrantless search conducted abroad by U.S. agents for foreign intelligence
purposes, and directed at an American citizen suspected of being an agent of a foreign
power. 5 s The court declared that requiring a judicial warrant for such a search would
impose "a significant and undue burden on the Executive." 59 However, the Fourth Amendment requires the search to be approved by either the president or the Attorney General.
The court nevertheless refused to exclude evidence obtained without such approval, finding
that it was collected in good faith, and that exclusion would not deter government misbehavior. In another ruling, the court decided that where extraterritorial application of a
federal statute to a foreign national for acts committed outside the United States is justified
by the "protective" principle of jurisdiction under international law, it also does not violate
the defendant's due process rights. 60
In a suit filed under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act § 1605(a)(7), 16 1 a federal judge
ordered Iran to pay $341 million in damages to Associated Press correspondent Terry Anderson and members of his family.16 In the 1980s, Anderson was held for nearly seven years
as a hostage in Beirut by Hezbollah, with support, the court found, from Iran.
In December, 124 states signed the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime.1 63 Not limited to counterterrorism, the Convention's broad purposes are
to strengthen international cooperation in combating serious crimes, to provide instruments
for law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies, to encourage prevention efforts, and to
support and protect victims of crime.
IV. U.S. Intelligence and Counterintelligence
The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 164includes several measures relevant to international security. As originally approved by Congress, the Act was vetoed by
President Clinton because of one enormously controversial provision, inserted during secret
hearings, that would for the first time have made an unauthorized disclosure of classified

Lockerbie Trial to Begin After Largest InternationalMurder Probe, ASSOCrATED PRESS, May 3, 2000; T.R. Reid,
ForLockerbie Families, Day in CourtArrives; Trial of 2 Libyans Opening in Netherlands,INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE,
May 3, 2000.
157. For a detailed description of the charges, with links to the indictment, see http://www.law.gla.ac.uk/
lockerbie/chargessummary.cfm.
158. United States v. bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
159. Id. at 273.
160. United States v. bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 216-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (Supp. IV 1998).
162. See U.S. Judge OrdersIran to Pay Millions to Ex-Hostage and Family, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2000.
163. See More than 120 Nations Sign New UN Convention on Tranmational OrganizedCrime, U.N. Doc. L/T/
4359, Dec. 15, 2000.
164. Pub. L. No. 106-567, 114 Stat. 2831 (2000).
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information punishable as a felony."'5 Passed again by the Congress without that provision,
the Act gained the president's signature.
The Act provides that no new law implementing a treaty or other international agreement
will render unlawful an "otherwise lawful and authorized intelligence activity" carried out
66
on behalf of and at the direction of the United States, unless the new law does so explicitly.1
Thus, for example, intelligence officials engaged in foreign intelligence surveillance might
ignore legislation intended to give effect to a treaty that guarantees a right of privacy, if the
new law does not specifically address such surveillance.
The Intelligence Authorization Act also directs the Attorney General to prepare a report
for the intelligence oversight committees describing authorities and procedures used by the
Justice Department to determine whether or not to turn over for law enforcement purposes
information collected under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). 167 No deadline was set for the report.
Throughout much of 1999 and 2000, headlines focused on charges that a Los Alamos
physicist, Wen Ho Lee, had stolen the design of America's most advanced nuclear weapon,
the W-88 warhead, and on suspicions that he had given it to China. 6 After an investigation
lasting five years, however, and Lee's confinement for nine months, he was released in
August 2000, and then pleaded guilty to a single felony count. 169 Accepting the plea, Judge
James Parker is reported to have remarked about the government's conduct of the case,
"This makes no sense to me." 70
In a legislative response to the Wen Ho Lee case, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA)' 7' was amended to require the Attorney General personally to review and to
justify in writing any decision not to approve an application for a court order for electronic
surveillance or a physical search.'72 The definition of "probable cause" was also expanded
to allow consideration of "past activities of the target, as well as facts and circumstances
' 3
relating to current or future activities of the target.' 1
In the FY 2000 Intelligence Authorization Act, Congress called on the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Attorney General
to submit to Congress a detailed analysis of the "legal standards employed by elements of
the intelligence community in conducting signals intelligence activities, including electronic
surveillance." 74 The required report was submitted in February. 75 It presents a concise
165. SeeThe White House, Statement by the Presidenton the Veto of HR 4392 (Nov.4, 2000), available at
http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/1 1/2000-11-04-statement-by-the-president-on-the-veto-of-hr.htnl.
166. Pub. L. No. 106-567, § 308, 114 Stat.
2831-2840.
167. Id. § 604(b), 114 Stat. 2853.
168. Lee was indicted for violations of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2275 (receipt of restricted data),
and 42 U.S.C. § 2276 (tampering with restricted data); and of the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793 (gathering,
transmitting or losing defense information). See United States v. Wen Ho Lee, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (D.N.M.
1999).
169. A detailed summary may be found in Matthew Purdy, The Making of a Suspect: The Case of Wen Ho Lee,
N.Y.TiMEs, Feb. 4, 2001; and Matthew Purdy with James Sterngold, The Prosecution Unravels: The Case ofWen
Ho Lee, N.Y.TMEs, Feb. 5, 2001.
170. Quoted in Purdy,The Prosecution Unravels, supra note 169.
171. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1829 (1994 & Supp.IV 1998).
172. Pub. L.No. 106-567, §§ 602(a),
603(a),
114 Stat.
2831, 2851-2852.
173. Id. §§ 602(b), 603(b), 114 Stat.
2831, 2851-2853.
174. Pub. L.No. 106-120, § 309, 113 Stat.
1606, 1613 (1999).
175. Legal Standardsfor the Intelligence Community in ConductingElectronic Surveillance,Feb. 8,2000,available
at http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/standards.hml.
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review of procedures and limits on investigations under FISA and Executive Order No.
12,333,176 emphasizing protections for the individual rights of U.S. persons. The report
does not, however, address the rights of aliens lawfully in the U.S., nor does it describe
classified minimization procedures for the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of intelligence information. It also fails clearly to set out limits on intelligence collection abroad
or to describe authorities for surveillance of persons not shown to be agents of a foreign
power. Moreover, it offers no guidance on the increasingly difficult distinction between
"
intelligence collection and law enforcement. 77
'
The European Parliament launched a new, yearlong investigation of the Echelon
worldwide electronic surveillance program operated by the United States and its Englishspeaking allies. One purpose was to determine whether encryption could guarantee citizens'
privacy or prevent industrial espionage that could give U.S. companies an unfair
advantage.'
The FY 2000 Intelligence Authorization Act also called on the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to report to Congress within nine months describing "all activities of
officers, covert agents, and employees of all elements of the intelligence community" with
respect to the assassination of Chilean President Salvador Allende in 1973, the accession
of General Augusto Pinochet to the presidency of Chile, and human rights violations by
Pinochet's officers and agents. 79 The report, released in September, concluded as follows:
1. We find no information-nor did the Church Committee-that CIA or the Intelligence
Committee was involved in the death of Chilean President Salvador Allende. He is believed
to have committed suicide as the coup plotters closed in on him.
2. CIA actively supported the military Junta after the overthrow of Allende but did not assist
Pinochet to assume the Presidency.
3. Many of Pinochet's officers were involved in systematic and widespread human rights abuses
following Allende's ouster. Some of these were contacts or agents of the CIA or US
military. 80
The report describes sustained CIA propaganda efforts in Chile, covert expenditures of
millions of dollars to strengthen opposition political parties, and the arming and encouragement of a 1970 coup attempt that left the head of the Army dead. It insists, however,
that while the CIA was aware of coup plotting in 1973, it "did not instigate the coup that
ended Allende's government," although it "probably appeared to condone it." 's After Pin-

ochet came to power, the agency recognized widespread human rights abuses by Chilean
security services, including "Operation Condor," but concluded that its continued contact
with them was "necessary for CIA's mission." s2 The report points an accusing finger at
President Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, calling Agency actions
176. 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981).
177. See William C. Banks, Trollingfor Terrorists: New Report Outlines Surveillance Authorities, NATIONAL.
SECURITY L. REP. (ABA Standing Comm. on Law & National Security), May-June 2000, at 10.
178. The investigation is described at http://www.europarl.eu.int/press/indexrechercheen.htm. Seealn
Tom Zeller, Cloak, Dagger, Echelon, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2000; Thomas Catan, Secrets and Spies, FIN. TMES
(London), May 31, 2000.
179. Pub. L. No. 106-120, § 311, 113 Stat. 1606, 1614 (1999).
180. Central Intelligence Agency, CIA Activities in Chile (Sept. 18, 2000), available at http://www.cia.gov/
cia/publications/chile/index.html.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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"deeply rooted in the policy of the period,"'' 3 and suggests that under today's standards the
CIA might have behaved differently.
In one closely watched Bivens action, a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals panel decided that
the CIA's alleged participation in the torture and murder of a Guatemalan citizen
"shock[ed] the conscience. "'4 However, relying on dictum in the Supreme Court's 1990
decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 8 1 the court declared that the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the torture abroad of nonresident foreign nationals who have not
"developed substantial connections with this country."' 86 Despite allegations of conspiracy
among several agencies inside the United States to abet the torture, the court said, the
"primary constitutionally significant conduct"-the torture of the decedent-occurred elsewhere.87 No mention was made of the 1980 Second Circuit decision in Filartigav. Pefia1 '88
Irala, which declared the "universal condemnation of torture.'
In the same case, however, the court ruled that when the CIA, National Security Council,
and State Department deliberately misled the plaintiff-the murdered Guatemalan's
widow-by falsely denying that they had information about the case, they deprived her of
her constitutional right to seek legal redress, even though they may have had no duty to
disclose the information to her. Had she known that the information existed, said the court,
she might have filed a FOIA request, petitioned appropriate government authorities, sought
an emergency injunction based on a tort claim, or publicized her husband's plight through
the media, perhaps in time to save his life.'89 The ruling may have implications for agency
reliance on the so-called Glomar response in FOIA and state secrets cases, when the government claims that it can neither confirm nor deny the existence of requested information. 90 The court also decided that agency officials enjoyed no qualified immunity when
they affirmatively misled the plaintiff "for the purpose of protecting themselves from being
held accountable in a court of law."' g'
V. Information Security
The Information Security Oversight Office reported that in FY 1999 more than eight
million documents, an increase of 10 percent over the previous year, were classified by
federal agencies.' 92 However, nearly 127 million pages of agency records, including many
more than twenty-five-years old, were declassified under the automatic and systematic declassification provisions of Executive Order 12,958,19 while another 84,000 pages were
declassified, in whole or in part, under mandatory review provisions of the same order. 94
The report bemoans the fact that declassification "has increasingly been adversely affected
183. Id.
184. Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
185. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
186. Harbury,233 F.3d at 603.
187. Id.
188. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
189. Harbury,233 F.3d at 608-610.
190. See Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Exec. Order No. 12,958, § 3.7(a), 60 Fed. Reg.
19,825 (1995); and 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(3) (1994).
191. Harbury,233 F.3d at 610-611.
192. Information Security Oversight Office, 1999 Report to the President(Aug. 15, 2000), available at http://
www.fas.org/ssgp/isoo/isoo99.html.
193. Exec. Order No. 12,958, §§ 3.4 and 3.5, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (1995).
194. Id. § 3.6.
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by partisan politics." 19 Evidence could be found in a 40 percent reduction in funding for
196
declassification activities by DOD in the FY 2001 Defense Authorization Act.
Another provision of the FY 2001 Defense Authorization Act effectively amended FOIA
by exempting from disclosure "sensitive information" provided by or produced in cooperation with a foreign government or international organization with the understanding
that it would not be released to the public, or if its withholding is requested by a foreign
government or international organization, or if its release would make it more difficult for
the U.S. government to get the same kind of information in the future. 197
In the wake of the Wen Ho Lee controversy and the temporary loss of hard drives
containing critical data at Los Alamos, the Departments of Energy and Defense proposed
a new classification category-called Sigma 16-to give increased protection to some of
the nation's most sensitive nuclear weapons information.198 But the two departments failed
to agree on a DOE proposal to declassify nuclear weapons data that it no longer considers
sensitive, including total stockpile quantities, and a breakdown of those quantities by purpose, delivery system, and active or inactive status. 199
The FY 2001 Intelligence Authorization Act creates a Public Interest Declassification
Board to advise on policy regarding the classification of national security information, to
promote "the fullest possible public access to a thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record of significant United States national security decisions and ... activities," and
to make recommendations on the declassification and release of information that is of "archival value." 00 While the measure could be read as laying the groundwork for reductions
in public access to such information, it includes a provision that gives an agency head
discretion to release "properly classified" information on the basis of a determination that
"the public's interest in the disclosure of records or materials of the agency ... outweighs
the Government's need to protect" them. 1
On April 16 and May 18, 2000, the New York Times published extensive information and
excerpts from a classified C.I.A. history of the agency's involvement with British officials
in the 1953 coup in Iran that toppled Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh and replaced
him with a reluctant Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi. 52° The report revealed that agency

195. Information Security Oversight Office, supra note 192, at 5.
196. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 1075, 114 Stat. 1654,
1654A-280 (2000).
197. Id. § 1073, 114 Stat. 1654A-277.
198. See Dept. of Defense, Department of Energy & National Nuclear Security Admin., Report of the Joint
Policy Groupfor the Protection of Nuclear Weapons Design and Use Control Information (Dec. 7, 2000), availableat
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/oint-report.html.
199. See Pentagon Blocks DOE Declassification Actions, SECREcY NEWS, Jan. 4, 2001, available at http://
www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2001/01/010401.html. Much information of this sort can be found currently in
the NUCLEAR WEAPONS DATABOOKS series published by the Natural Resources Defense Council, e.g., William
M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris, & Joshua Handler, TAKING STOCK: WORLDWIDE NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS 1998
(1998).
200. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-567, § 703(h), 114 Stat. 2831,
2856-2859 (2000).
201. Id. § 706(c), 114 Stat. 2831, 2862.
202. See James Risen, Secrets ofHistory: The History of the CIA in Iran, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, availableat
http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html; National Security Archive, TheSecret CIA History of the Iran Coup, 1953 (Nov. 29, 2000), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB28/index.html, with links to the documents.
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officials worked directly with Iranian royalist military officers to pick Mossadegh's successor,
directed a campaign of bombings by Iranians posing as members of the Communist Party,
and planted articles and editorial cartoons in newspapers, then provided funding for the
new government.
November saw the release of some 50,000 pages of previously classified records concerning the death of President Salvador Allende and the accession of Augusto Pinochet as
head of Chile's government. °3 This was the last of four installments under the Clinton
administration's special Chile Declassification Project. The documents trace U.S. covert
operations between 1968 and 1975 to destabilize the democratically elected Allende government and, after the violent 1973 coup, to bolster the military regime of Pinochet. They
record Richard Nixon's commitment to "do everything we can to bring Allende down."' Hailed as a victory for "human rights abroad and the American public's right-to-know at
home," 05 the release provides new information for historians and for litigants.
Late in the year, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright ordered the declassification review
and release of State Department documents relating to human rights violations in Argentina
during the 1976-1983 military dictatorship there.2° 6 The order came in response to mutual
legal assistance treaty requests from the governments of Spain and Argentina.
President Clinton extended an almost unprecedented exemption from disclosure of classified information concerning Air Force compliance with the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act at the secretive Groom Lake, Nevada, air base known as Area 5 1.027
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a lower court refusal to issue a subpoena
duces tecum for records admittedly held by the National Security Agency (NSA) relating
to Princess Diana.20° Ruling on an application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which authorizes a
district court to order production of statements or documents for use in proceedings in a
foreign or international tribunal, the appeals courts said the applicant should have demonstrated how the information sought would assist his participation in proceedings before
a French court, and how its production would encourage foreign governments to honor
similar requests from litigants in U.S. courts. More important, the court declared that
§ 1782 "simply did not anticipate the issuance of a subpoena for documents whose disclosure
would likely harm the national security."2" 9 The court neglected to mention that the statute
expressly preserves the right to invoke "any legally applicable privilege,"' 0 including, presumably, the state secrets privilege, something the NSA apparently failed to do in this case.
In another case with security implications, a Florida district court granted a FOIA request
for information about licenses for the export of goods and services to Cuba.-1 The government insisted that denial was authorized by FOIA Exemption 3, which permits withholding of records that are "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute." ' Although
203. See National Security Archive, Chile: 16,000 Secret U.S. Documents Declassified(Nov. 13, 2000), available
at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/news/20001113,with links to the released documents.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. United States Dept. of State, Statement by CharlesF. Hunter,Acting Spokesman (Nov. 17, 2000), available
at www.fas.org/sgp/news/2000/1 1/dosl 117000.html.
207. Presidential Determination No. 2000-30, Sept. 19, 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 59,339 (2000).
208. Al Fayed v. United States, 210 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2000).
209. Id. at 425.

210. 28 U.S.C. § 1782.
211. Times Publishing Co. v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (M.D. Fla. 2000).
212. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1994).
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there was no relevant act of Congress in force, the government relied on an executive order
issued under the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA)13 to extend the
effectiveness of the lapsed Export Administration Act (EAA), 14 § 12(c) of which would have
expressly permitted the withholding. In the first week of 2001, however, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on grounds that when Congress subsequently reenacted the
EAA, a single Senator's remarks in the legislative history and the president's signing statement(!) showed Congress's intent for the executive order to extend the effect of the statute
in the interim." 5

213. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1994).

214. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 241 l(c) (1994).
215. Times Publishing Co. v. United States, 236 F.3d 1286 (1 th Cir. 2001).
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